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0. A b s tr a c t1
One of the m ain  sem antic roles of free focus (cf. van Leusen and K álm án (1993)) 
is expressing contrast, e.g., in contrastively co-ordinated sentences. C onsider the 
following exam ple, from Hungarian:
(1) Nem  PÉTER eszik, hanem  PÁL.2 
not P eter eats b u t Paul
‘It is not Peter who is eating, but P au l’
Note th a t the  non-focussed parts  of the contrasted clauses (which I will call focus 
frames in the  following) carry  a presupposition. For exam ple, the sentence in (1) 
presupposes th a t someone is eating.
This pap er is dedicated to the problem of a special type of contrastive co­
ordination in H ungarian,3 superficially similar to the type illustra ted  in  (1), b u t 
in terpreted  differently:
(2) Nem a VONAT kerül sokba, hanem ÉN voltam beteg. 
not the  train  is expensive but I was ill
‘It is no t th a t the  tra in  is expensive, bu t th a t I was ill’
Obviously, th is sentence presupposes neither th a t som ething was expensive, nor 
th a t someone was ill. Instead , it is to be used in a conversation in which th e  com­
m on ground (the  context) includes a fact tha t the two clauses may offer a lternative 
explanations for. For exam ple, the common base of the two clauses in (2) m ight be 
‘I did not com m ute’, gmd either the fact th a t the tra in  is expensive or th a t  I was 
ill are plausible explanations for this fact. This m eans th a t, in a  sentence like (2), 
two propositions are contrasted . Therefore, I will account for the syntactic  aspect 
of the phenom enon using focus projection (cf. Selkirk (1984:Ch5)), i.e., a mech­
anism  th a t shifts focus from  the prosodically prom inent elem ent to a constituen t 
containing it (see section 1).
From the  semantic po in t of view, I will address two questions: (i) W h at is 
the  ‘focus fram e’ when entire  propositions are in focus? (ii) How can we account 
for the relationship between the common base and b o th  co-ordinated clauses? As 
for the question in (i), I will propose th a t the focus fram e is the common base of 
the  two clauses. As for (ii), an account of how the com m on base is shared will be
1 I am grateful to László K álm án for his comments abou t both  the substance 
and the phrasing of th is paper and for the TgXwork he did on it.
2 In this and  the following examples, prosodically prom inent elements are w rit­
ten w ith SMALL CAPITALS.
3 Russian examples work analogously.
2offered within the framework of the Linguistic Discourse Model (LD M ) of Polanyi 
(19SS) (see section 2), which I will provide w ith a dynamic semantics, along the 
lines of Groenendijk and Stokhof (1990) (in section 3).
1. C o n tra st and Free F ocu s
Since the type of sentences th a t I will concentrate on involve bo th  contrast and 
free focus, I will first exam ine these two concepts (sections 1 .1 -1 .2 ). In sec­
tion  1 .3 , I will sketch how exam ples like (2) fit into the paradigm  of contrast and 
co-ordination.
1 .1 . C ontrast
By contrast I will m ean a p a ir of inconsistent propositions, i.e., two propositions 
th a t cannot be true a t the sam e time. C ontrast has two m ain subtypes:
(a) A pair of contrasted propositions may originate from two different speak­
ers in a conversation. This case might be called correction (the second 
proposition is a corrective reply to the first);
(b) If the two propositions are p art of the same assertion, connected w ith a 
conjunction, then one of the propositions has to be negated, otherwise the 
entire assertion would be a  contradiction. In this case, we can speak of a 
contrastive conjunction.
There are other types of relations between propositions th a t are sometimes 
called contrast. In particu lar, clauses can be opposed for rhetorical reasons, e.g., 
because of the incom patibility of the expectations that they give rise to. I will 
refer to those cases as adversity ra th e r than  contrast. For example, the following 
sentences are instances of adversity, bu t not of contrast:
(3) I  am old, but you are young.'
(4) The cup is warm but the tea is cold.
In H ungarian, contrast has a conjunction of its own (hanem  ‘b u t’), distinct from 
those of'adversity (de, pedig etc.). In accordance with my definition of contrast, 
these conjunctions stand  in a  complem entary distribution:
(5) Péter nem utazott el, *de/hanem  a városban kószál.
Peter not left b u tadv /bu tcontr the city-in strolls
‘Peter has not left, he is strolling in tow n’
3(6) Péter nem horkol, de/*hanem elaludt.
Peter not snores b u taav/b u tcontr slept 
‘Peter is not snoring, b u t he is asleep’
The first proposition in (5) would be inconsistent w ith the second w ithout the nega­
tion, thus only the contrastive conjunction is appropriate  there. To the contrary, 
the propositions in (6) are far from incompatible (indeed, snoring entails sleeping), 
so only an  adversative conjunction can be used. It expresses th a t P e te r’s sleeping 
would give rise to the expectation th a t he is snoring, b u t he is not.
U nder the above approach, contrast need not involve free focus. The sentence 
in (5) qualifies as contrastive co-ordination, although its clauses contain no free 
focus, unless we want to regard their verb phrases as focussed.
1 .2 . F ree F ocu s
T he sem antics of free focus involves three components: the focussed part, the focus 
frame, and  the relevant domain. Both the focussed p a rt and  the focus fram e have 
an overt representation in the syntax. The former is connected to the prosodic 
prom inence of one word or phrase, which is either identical or p a rt of the focussed 
p a rt. T he focus frame includes w hat remains after ex trac ting  the focussed p art 
from the sentence. Finally, the relevant domain has no overt representation in 
syntax, its  content is to be com puted from the context somehow.
According to K arttunen  and  Peters (1979), free focus presupposes the  ex­
istence of some entity  of the  sam e type as the focussed p a rt for which the  focus 
fram e holds. The m aim assertion of a sentence tha t contains a  free focus is th a t the 
focus fram e holds exhaustively (i.e ., uniquely and m axim ally) for the constituent 
in focus. Van Leusen and K álm án (1993) arranges these m eaning com ponents 
differently. They locate the exhaustivity in the presuppositional part. T h a t is, ac­
cording to  them , the presupposition of the sentence is th a t  there  exists som ething 
of the  sam e type as the focussed p a rt for which the focus fram e holds exhaustively. 
They posit th a t the m ain assertion is the identification of the  focussed p a rt w ith 
the presupposed unique m axim al entity. In both theories, the  function of the rel­
evant dom ain is to restrict the domain on which exhaustiv ity  operates to a set of 
contextually  relevant entities. In some cases, the relevant dom ain plays no role at 
all.
It follows from either of the above theories th a t a  co-ordination of a negative 
and  an affirmative clause th a t have different focussed p a rts  and the sam e focus 
fram e qualifies as a contrastive co-ordination. Taken for granted th a t the  rele­
vant dom ain is the same for bo th  clauses, the two clauses m ust share the  same 
presuppositions, because they share the focus frame. W ithou t the negation, the 
two propositions m ust be contradictory, since the focus fram es have to hold true
4exhaustively for two different focussed parts. So the conditions for contrast are 
satisfied in such a case.
'- i f  the focus frames of th e  co-ordinated clauses are not identical, then the
two clauses may refer to the sam e issue, but they are not inconsistent. Such co­
ordinations are not necessarily incorrect, but they do not express contrast (in the 
following, the focussed parts will be enclosed in [•]F):
(7) Nem az érett [FÉRFIAK]F tetszenek Zsuzsának,
not the m ature m en appeal Sue-DAT
hanem az *[a g g a STYÁNOI<]f /  érett [g YÜMÖLCSÖk]f . 
but the graybeards/ ripe fruits
‘It is not m ature men, b u t graybeards/ripe fruits th a t Sue likes’
In th e  starred version of (7), th e  focus frame of the first clause is different from th a t 
of th e  second: it includes the adjective érett ‘mature, ripe’, which the focus frame 
of th e  second clause does not. This sentence could still work as a non-contrastive 
co-ordination (of two focus-containing sentences), if it was not conjoined with the 
obligatorily contrastive conjunction hanem.
Although, as we saw in th e  previous section, free focus is not a necessary 
ingredient of contrastive co-ordination, those cases in which only one of the con- 
trastively  co-ordinated clauses contains free focus seem infelicitous:
(8) * Károly nem volt vegetáriánus, hanem [IRMGARD]^ volt az.
Charles not was vegetarian  but Irmgard was it
‘Charles was not a vegetarian, it is Irmgard who was one’
T h is  sentence certainly satisfies the criteria I have proposed for contrastive co­
ordination. The first clause contains (in a negated form) the proposition th a t 
th e re  is at least one person who was vegetarian, namely, Charles; the second clause 
claim s that there is a unique person who was vegetarian, namely, Irm gard. The 
contradiction is obvious. A ccording to van Leusen and Kálmán (1993), (8) is out 
because of a presupposition failure. The second clause presupposes the existence 
of a  unique vegetarian, but the  first clause fails to provide a context entailing this.
1 .3 . F ocussed  P ro p o sit io n s: C ontrasted  E x p la n a tio n s
In H ungarian (as íveli as in R ussian), there are contrastive co-ordinations (like (2) 
or th e  examples in (9-11) below) the properties of which do not seem to square 
w ith  the concept of contrastivity  sketched in section 1.1:
5(9) Nem  PÉTER aludt a padlón,
not Peter slept the floor-on
hanem a HÁZIGAZDA költözött szállodába.
b u t the host moved hotel-into
‘It is not th a t P eter slept on the floor, bu t th a t the  host moved to a  ho te l’ 
Common base: ‘the accom m odation worked out well’
(10) Nem  PÉTER nem hozta el a tortát,
n o t  Pe te r  no t  b rough t the  cake-ACC
hanem a CUKRÁSZ nem készült el még vele.
b u t the confectioner not was-ready yet it-w ith
‘It is not th a t P eter did not bring the cake, b u t th a t the confectioner has 
not prepared it y e t’
Common base: ‘the cake is not here’
(11) Nem  PÉTER nem kapcsolta fel a villanyt,
no t P e te r  no t tu rn e d  on the light-ACC
hanem a HÁZBAN van áramszünet.
b u t the house-in is power cut
‘It is not th a t P eter did not tu rn  the light on, b u t th a t there is a power cut 
in the house’
Common base: ‘the light is not on’
These co-ordinations show the typical properties of contrast: a negative and  an  
assertive clause are co-ordinated in each of them , and  b o th  contain prosodically 
prom inent elements. Furtherm ore, the occurrence of the  conjunction hanem  is an  
independent argum ent for their contrastivity.
O n the  other hand, the sentences in (9-11) have a  very peculiar feature as 
well, namely, th a t there are no common elements in the  co-ordinated clauses which 
could indicate the focus fram e of the contrast (cf. Szabolcsi (1981)). To explain 
why there  is no overt focus fram e in these sentences, I propose th a t each clause 
belongs to the focussed part as a whole:
(9) Nem  [PÉTER aludt a padlón\F , hanem [a HÁZIGAZDA költözött szállodába\F.
(10) Nem  [PÉTER nem hozta el a tortát\F, hanem  [a CUKRÁSZ nem készült el 
még vele]F.
(11) Nem  [PÉTER nem kapcsolta fel a villanyt]F, hanem  [a HÁZBAN van áram­
szünet]1^ .
From  the sem antic point of view, the propositions in the co-ordinated clauses 
in (9-11) are not inherently incom patible w ith each o ther. I suggest th a t these
6propositions are competing explanations for the common base. T heir incom pat­
ib ility  is linked to th is role: due to the exhaustive character of free focus, bo th  
explanations are presented^as unique and maximal explanations for the common 
base.
T h e  syntactic and  semantic aspects of the approach sketched above corrob­
o ra te  each other. T he informal term  ‘exhaustive explanation’ corresponds to a 
focussed clause in the  syntax and a  focussed proposition in the sem antics. This is 
w hat characterizes the  phenom enon illustrated  in (2) and (9-11). In w hat follows, 
I will refer to this construction as contrastive co-ordination with focussed clauses, 
or CCFC  for short.
To make the explanation proposed above explicit, I will now exam ine (i) how 
the focussed p a rt extends from the prosodically prom inent word to the entire 
clause (section 1 .3 .1 ), and (ii) how the  concept of explanations can be fit into the 
sem antics of contrasted  propositions (section 1.3 .2).
1 .3 .1 . F ocus P r o je c tio n
In th e  literature on focus, the technical devices used for explaining the  connection 
betw een prosodic prom inence and semantic focus are known as focus projection 
(henceforth, F P ). T here are two m ajor theories about FP  in the transform ational­
ist trad ition : Chom sky (1971) and Selkirk (1984). Both theories assume a level of 
representation  of focus extension, which mediates between the phonological form 
(prosody) and the sem antic m odule (meaning). A one-to-one m apping is assumed 
betw een focus extension and m eaning, while the function from focus extension to 
prosody is a neutralizing one. The the  two theories are quite dissim ilar, they share 
two im portan t features1 connected to  the treatm ent suggested in th is paper: (i) nei­
th e r of them  excludes the theoretical possibility of focussed clauses; and  (ii) neither 
of th em  can be applied to H ungarian (or Russian) w ithout modifications.
B oth  authors claim  th a t the focussed part is always a constituent. Accord­
ing to  Chomsky (1971), the m axim al potential focussed part is the highest VP 
of a  clause (th a t is, an S or IP cannot be focussed). This does not exclude the 
possibility  of focussed clauses, because an entire clause might be dom inated by 
a  V P. Furtherm ore, Chomsky (1971) posits tha t prosodic prom inence is always 
carried  by the last word of the focussed part. On the other hand, the two lan­
guages quoted here (i.e., H ungarian and Russian) exhibit an opposite d istribution 
of prosodic prominence: it is m ostly the first word of the focussed p a rt th a t is 
prosodically prom inent (in the following examples, embedded foci represent a lter­
n a tiv e  focussed p a rts , only one of which realizes):
(12) a. He was [warned [to look out for [an [ex-convict [with [a red 
s h ir t ]f ]f ]f ]f ]f ]f .
b. He was warned to look out for an ex-convict with a [r e d ] F  shirt.
7(7 ') a. Nem az érett [FÉRFIAI<]F tetszenek Zsuzsának, hanem ...
‘It is not m ature MEN th a t Sue likes, b u t . .. ’
. . . a z  érett [GYÜMÖLCSÖK]^, 
the ripe fruits 
‘ripe fru its’
* . . .a z  [AGGASTYÁNOK^, 
the  greybeards 
‘greybeards’
* . .  . [VACSORÁZNI szeret járni]F. 
dinner-INF likes go-INF 
‘she likes to go to d inners’
b. Nem az [[[ÉRETT]F férfiak]F tetszenek]F Zsuzsának, hanem ...
‘It is not M ATURE men th a t Sue likes, b u t . .. ’
. . . a z  [ÉLTES]F férfiak. 
the  elderly men 
‘elderly m en’
. ..  az [AGGASTYÁNOK]77, 
the  greybeards 
‘greybeards’
. . .  [VACSORÁZNI szeret járni]F 
dinner-INF likes go-INF 
‘she likes to go to d inners’
The th ree  possible continuations in (7 'b) correspond to wider and w ider focussed 
parts  in the  first clause.
This type of difference between English, on the one hand, and H ungarian  and 
Russian, on the  o ther, suggests a solution involving syntactic param eters. Selkirk 
(1984) form ulates her theory of F P  in term s of head, argum ents and  adjuncts. 
Prosodic prom inence — as a reflex of the ‘focus’ feature — is always associated  
with a word. This word is always a possible focussed part. If it is the  head  or 
an unm oved argum ent of a phrase, then the phrase itself is a possible focussed 
p art as well. A djuncts are excluded from the recursion. This theory is m uch m ore 
permissive th an  Chom sky’s (1971), yet it cannot account for the H ungarian  (and 
Russian) facts abou t modified constructions in focus. In (7 'b), the en tire  m odified 
construction can be in terpreted as a focussed p art, though prosodic prom inence is 
carried by an ad junct, namely, the adjective. So F P  has to be investigated fu rther.
1 .3 .2 . S e m a n tic s  for C o n tra sted  E x p la n a tio n s
This section approaches the semantics of CCFC in two steps. F irst, I am  going
8to  make the m eaning of focussed propositions explicit. Then I will outline the 
problem s arising from the co-ordination of two such propositions.
As for the m eaning of focussed propositions, it should be guaranteed somehow 
th a t  the focussing of propositions is analogous to the focussing of o ther types of 
objects. A generalized non-syncategorem atic formulation of the m eaning of free 
focus would prove ra ther useful for carrying this out, and by applying this tre a t­
m en t to propositions would provide us w ith a  null-hypothesis on w hat a focussed 
proposition means. In w hat follows, I will construct such a form ulation along the 
lines of van Leusen and K álm án  (1993).
Exhaustivity can be cap tu red  using the concept of infímum  of lattice theory. 
T h a t is, the in terp re ta tion  of exhaustivity requires a partially ordered set. If each 
item  in the syntactic category of the focussed p art is semantically represented 
as a  set of those entities th a t  tu rn  them into true sentences, then the subset 
re la tion  over those sets will do the job of the partial ordering. For example, in the 
case of noun phrases, the p a rtia l ordering will be the subset relation over sets of 
predicates. The NP Peter corresponds to the set of those predicates th a t are true 
for the individual assigned to  Peter. The semantic counterpart of Peter and Paul 
is the set of predicates tru e  for both individuals, i.e., the set resulting from the 
intersection of the  two respective sets. Therefore, the semantic value of Peter and 
Paul is a subset of the denotations of both  Peter and Paul and is thus ordered 
a fte r them.
If the focussed p art is sem antically of type a  s.t. 3ß.(ß ,t) — ct(i.e., it can be 
considered a characteristic function of a set fp), then there is a poset (D a ; C)  where 
D a is the set of the denotations of all term s of type o , and C is the subset relation 
over them. The focus, fram e and  the relevant domain are both of type (a ,t) ,  so 
th ey  can be seen as characteristic functions of some sets i f  and rd, respectively. 
Free focus presupposes th a t there  is an entity  X  of type ct such th a t
X  =  f \ ( i f  n  rd).
Furtherm ore, the  sentence containing free focus asserts that
fp =  f \ ( f f  H rd )4.
W hat rem ains to be done is to instantiate fp, i f  and rd  for the case when an 
an tire  clause is focussed. I have assumed th a t the focussed part is sem antically a
4 Assuming an ‘externallly  dynam ic’ presupposition operator 6 for which the 
following equivalence holds (cf. Beaver (1992)):
->(6(X) A Y )  =  S(X) A ~Y,
9proposition. T hough there'\is no overt focus fram e in the sentence, we still assum e 
for the sem antics th a t there is a function m apping propositions into their t ru th  
values in the  actual world. This is also a characteristic function the corresponding 
set of which is W act- Let the focussed proposition be q. Assuming no relevant 
dom ain, the application of the categorem atic form ula yields
q =
Since TTact is a  set of propositions, the p artia l ordering over it is sem antic en tail- 
m ent. Being the  infimum of Wact means th a t all propositions true  in the ac tu a l 
world follow from  q. Using a blasphemous paraphrase, q is the prima causa5 of 
the actual world.
This form ulation of the meaning of focussed propositions is too strong, because 
its exhaustiv ity  ranges over an exceedingly large dom ain of propositions. T h is  set 
has to be constrained. Two questions arise a t this point: (i) W hat should constra in  
it? (ii) To which m eaning component should the restrictor belong?
Ad  (i): I propose th a t the domain of exhaustiv ity  consists of all and only the 
propositions th a t possibly specify, elaborate on or detail the common base. In 
w hat follows, I will refer to the relation th a t holds between these propositions and  
the common base as SED  (from the initials of the term s Specification, E labo ra tion  
and D etail). T he content of the common base (henceforth, CB) may vary from  
context to context, b u t the character of its relation to the relevant propositions 
rem ains the  sam e. We will build this into our representation in the following 
way. Let SED cb s tand  for the set of those propositions th a t are SE D -related  
to the com m on base CB. The focussed proposition is the infimum of the set of 
propositions th a t bo th  are true in the actual world and stand  in the SED re la tio n  
to the CB:
q = / \ ( W act n  SED c b )-
A d  (ii): Since there are three components (fp, f f  and rci), th ree  possibilities 
are open. T he focussed p a rt can surely be excluded as the possible carrier of 
SEDc b , because SED cb has to be a sub-form ula th a t infimum operates on. T h ere  
still are two candidates. SED cb is either identical to rd, or a subform ula of ff. T he  
la tte r possibility needs fu rther explanation. Let us assume th a t the  tran sla tio n  of 
a clause in the  discourse includes a sub-form ula th a t there exists a p roposition
we could represent the meaning of focus as follows:
S (3 X .X  = / \ ( f f  n  rd)) A X  = fp.
5 Cf. St. Thom as, Summa Theologiae.
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(namely, the  common base) to which the proposition of the clause is SED-related. 
That sub-formula is so general that it does not change the tru th  conditions of the 
entire formula. A bstracting  away from  the proposition of the clause yields the 
semantic equivalent of th e  f f :
Ap(3CB.p G SEDcb & p{wact))-
This is a characteristic function  of a set of propositions which is conceivably iden­
tical to W ict fl SEDc b - In  section 2, I will present some independent m otivation 
for the presence of SEDcb  in  the translation of clauses as they appear in discourse.
The distinction betw een the focus fram e and the  relevant domain can be ju s­
tified straightforwardly. T h e  focus fram e is an essential component of sentences 
containing free focus. It m ust exhaustively hold for the focussed part. As for the 
relevant domain, it is only a  supplem entary device to avoid too strong readings. 
From this point of view, it seems plausible th a t SED cb should be identical to the 
relevant domain, since its  purpose is also to avoid too strong readings. Never­
theless, I w ant to argue th a t  either the f f  and the rd  are to be conflated or else 
SEDcb is to  belong to th e  focus frame.
„ As fa r as the first possibility is concerned, the properties of the focus fram e 
and the relevant domain a re  largely identical. Both components are of the same 
semantic type. Both focus frames and relevant dom ains must be shared by the 
members of contrastive co-ordinations. The relevant dom ain has no overt linguistic 
representation, so its con ten t is com puted somehow from the context. According 
to van Leusen and K álm án (1993:9), focus frames are also left implicit quite often, 
in which case their content is also to be com puted from  the context. In sum, if we 
were to conflate the two, m any questions would not arise at all.
If we did not conflate f f  and rd, then  SEDcb should be a sub-formula of ff. My 
argument for this runs as follows. The relevant dom ain may occur in any instance 
of free focus, irrespective of the type of the focussed constituent. On the o ther 
hand, SED cb is linked to  a  particular category of focussed parts. It only appears 
when the fp  is a proposition, and then  it is obligatorily there. Now, the focus 
frame is likewise category specific. It is the result of abstracting over the focussed 
part. If we want to explain  why it is present when a  proposition is focussed, we 
have to include it in the  focus frame.
To assess whether C C FC  qualifies as genuine contrast, we have to check 
whether it satisfies our crite ria  for contrast. If we disregard the restriction to 
SEDc b , the  answer is clearly  on the positive. T here cannot be more than  one 
prima causa of one possible world: two such propositions must be inconsistent 
or equivalent. If we also take the restriction to SED cb into account, then the 
requirem ents for contrast are satisfied only if CB is the same in each and every 
clause. W hen entities of o ther types are focussed, the linguistic identity of focus 
frames ensures that they  refer to the same thing. Although SED cb is not an
11
overt p a rt of the focus fram e, co-ordinated focussed clauses are still in terp re ted  
in a  way th a t they refer to the same issue. P u ttin g  the problem  in form al term s, 
one should ensure th a t the propositional variable CB in a  clause be able to  b ind 
the occurrence of the variable in-another clause. The problem  seems to challenge 
com positionality.
In the  following section, I will present some m otivation for the presence of 
SED cb as a  sub-form ula in every proposition of a piece of discourse. In section 3, 
I will a ttem p t to give a formal account of the cross-sentential binding of p roposi­
tional variables.
2. D isc o u r se  S tr u c tu re  and  C om m on  B a se
2 .1 . T h e  L in g u istic  D isco u rse  M o d el
The individual sentences in a  discourse usually do not contain  all inform ation 
necessary for in terpreting  them . Anaphors carry par excellence (referentially) 
partia l inform ation, bu t individual sentences may also rem ain agnostic about o ther 
— spatial, tem poral, m odal etc. — aspects of meaning. In principle, a piece of 
discourse as a whole is in terpretable. So there m ust be algorithm s to com plete 
underspecified or missing inform ation. This implies th a t discourse m ust be a 
s truc tu red  entity. On the o ther hand, the fact th a t sentences in a  piece of discourse 
are in te rp re ted  together implies th a t discourse has got coherence on its own. For 
exam ple, topics cannot follow one another in an arb itra ry  m anner, and old topics 
cannot be taken up again arbitrarily.
Polanyi’s (1988) ’Linguistic Discourse Model (LD M ) is a  formalized theory  
about discourse structure . Pieces of discourse are seen as constructed  from  dis­
course constituent units (dcus) using recursive syntactic rules. Every dcu is associ­
ated  w ith  a sem antic content, and every syntactic rule has a sem antic coun terpart 
th a t com putes the sem antic content of composed dcus from the  sem antics of their 
constituents.
So dcus are either atomic or composed. Every clause au tom atically  belong 
to  the form er category, and no other entities belong there. Even though discourse 
particles are not dcus at all, from the point of view of the  theory they count 
as kind of atom ic. They come in three varieties: rhetorical ( because, therefore), 
logical (and, or, if . . .  then . . . )  and push/pop  m arkers (well, anyway). This 
subcategorization is sem antically motivated.
Com posed dcus are split into subcategories, too. T here are co-ordinations, 
subordinations, interruptions and binary structures. Since the  properties of each 
subcategory are determ ined by the syntactical/sem antical ru le  th a t creates the 
com posed dcu in question, they will be presented together w ith  the syntax and  
sem antics of LDM.
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The gram m ar of discourse consists of context-free rules. Its basic — nom ­
inalist — intention is to represent all the atomic dcus as term inals and all the 
composed ones as non-term inals. Composed dcus of any subcategory can function 
as discourse initiators.
A co-ordination can be rew ritten  as the sequence of an arb itrary  num ber of 
dcus of any type. Rules abou t subordination are more restricted: they can be con­
structed  of a t m ost two dcus. A ra ther im portan t linear precedence rule applies to 
th e ir construction: the subordinating dcu always precedes the subordinated one. 
The typical subordinative discourse operators are because, since, whereas. Ac­
cording to the  classification in  Polanyi and Scha (1984), the residual subcategories 
range with the  previous two. Interuptions only differ from subordinations in their 
semantics. B inary structures are either subordinative (these are the p a r  excellence 
subordinations) or co-ordinative. The la tte r type includes some logical and deduc­
tive types of co-ordination. T h e ir typical discourse operators are either . . .  or . . . ,  
if . . .  then . . .  and therefore. By definition, they must consist of two dcus.
The semantics of the LDM  uses context frames (cfs). Every context fram e is 
associated w ith a dcu token (an  integer in the case of atom ic dcus, the symbols 
C or S, which indicates the  type of composition). Formally speaking, cfs are 
ordered n-tuples (in practice, triples). There is a slot for each piece of inform ation 
th a t is relevant for the context: one for participants, one for time , and one for 
the  properties and relations of participants. Polanyi (1988) uses these param eters 
only, although nothing in the  theory excludes the possibility of other slots, e.g., for 
space and modality. The fram e of atom ic dcus is given by the formal translation  
(or at least expressible in its  term s). The information about the assignment of 
values to individual variables appears in the slot for participants; the inform ation 
about tem poral variable assignm ents appears in the tim e slot; and the inform ation 
about the in terpreta tion  function  appears in the slot for properties and relations. 
T he frame of composed dcus is com puted from the frames of their constituents 
and  from the character of the  composition.
The operation th a t com putes the fram e of co-ordinative dcus is called Gen­
eralized Union ( GU ). It operates on a set of vectors, and calculates ‘the most 
restrictive relevant na tu ra l s e t’ (Polanyi (1988:617)) or ‘the most specific common 
denom inator’ (Polanyi and Scha (1984:574)) for each slot. The GU also acts as a 
condition on co-ordinability. T he unification cannot result in a trivial frame, e.g., 
(NOW, exist). Although the  au thors provide us with m any examples of the result 
of calculating GUs, they rem ain  agnostic on how exactly it works.
(13) a. Jim  took all the home ec. courses in the high school.
l(J im ,P A S T , take all the  home ec. courses in the high school)
b. He took the Cordon Bleu Course in France last year.
2(Jim , PAST, take the  Cordon Bleu Course in France)
a-fib. C (Jim , PAST, take  courses)
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If we co-ordinate the sentences in (13a) and (13b) w ith the cf th a t follow them , 
the context fram e of the co-ordination will be as in (13a+b). It is the  result of th e  
GU of the two individual context frames. In this example, two atom ic dcus were 
composed into a co-ordination. But remember th a t bo th  GU and the syn tactic  
operation of co-ordination may operate on an arb itra ry  num ber of dcus, including 
composed ones.
The fram e inheritance mechanism of subordination is ra th e r simple: the w hole 
subordination  always inherits the frame of the subordinating constituent. B oth in ­
terrup tions and  subordinative binary structures (proper subordinations) are c h a r­
acterized by th is configuration of context frames. B ut there is an ex tra  condition 
on the  la tte r. P roper subordinating dcus m ust s tand  in a so-called IS-A  re la ­
tion to  the proper subordinated ones, while the same condition does not hold for 
the constituents of interruptions. For the IS-A relation, Polanyi (1984) ad o p ts  
J .R . H obbs’ definition as a starting-point:
‘A segment of discourse is (stands in the IS-A rela tion  w ith) the
segment So if the same proposition P  can be inferred from b o th  So and
S i, and  one of the argum ents of P  is more fully specified in  Si than  in
S0.’
Even though Polanyi (1984) does not revise this form ulation explicitly, in p ractice  
she qualifies a  m uch broader class of relations as instances of the  IS-A rela tion . 
Polanyi (1984) considers (14) as proper subordination:
(14) a. Jim  is a great cook.
l(J im , NOW, being a great cook)
b. He has been learning cooking for a long time.
2(Jim , PAST, learn cooking for a long time)
A lthough the relation between (14a) and (14b) does not fit well in to  the H obbsian 
definition, Polanyi assumes th a t it is an IS-A relation. There are some propositions 
th a t are ‘corollaries’ of bo th  (14a) and (14b) (e.g., ‘Jim  has some experience in 
cooking’) w ith  respect to which (14b) is more specific than  (14a) in some sense.
Since com posed dcus can also constitute subordination, the IS-A relation has 
to be defined for them , too. There is a proposition th a t can be reconstructed  from  
the cf of dcus. Its predicate is taken from the slot for properties and  relations, w hile 
its individual and tem poral argum ents come from the o ther slots. T his proposition 
is called the discourse theme (D 9), and it stands in the IS-A rela tion  w ith the clcu. 
For atom ic dcus, D 9 is identical w ith the proposition of their clause. The D 9 of a  
co-ordination is the new proposition com puted through GU, w hereas the character 
of the D 9 of a  subordination depends on the character of the subordinating  clcu.
Every LDM analysis has a graphical representation as well, called the D is­
course Parse Tree (D PT). In the example below, the piece of discourse in (15) is
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represented by the D P T  in (16). In (15), indentation represents subordination, 
and equal indentation represents co-ordination. In (16), indentation represents 
dominance: the daughters of a tree node follow their m other node w ith an inden­
tation.
(15) a. Jim is a great cook.
b. He took all the home ec. courses in the high school.
c. He worked as a cook in the army.
d. He took the Cordon Bleu Course in France last year.
S^Jim, NOW, be a  great cook) 
a ( . . . )
b ( . . .)  c( • • •) d ( . ..)
The D P T  format is not only a visually expressive device, bu t also enables Polanyi 
to form ulate well-formedness/felicity conditions on how pieces of discourse can be 
increm ented with new dcus in terms of adjunction. It would be hard  to do this in 
terms of a  linear representation.
New units are incorporated  in the  structure of the  discourse in accordance 
with the  semantic re la tion  they bear to  one of its dcus. If this relation is of the 
IS-A type, the new clause will be subordinated to the  old dcu; if the new clause 
has a non-trivial common denom inator w ith the old one, they will be co-ordinated. 
Syntactically, this is realized by a step of (proper or not-so-proper) adjunction (cf. 
section 2 .1 .1 ).
However, not every old dcu of the discourse is accessible to the new clause. 
Polanyi formulates a  condition on accessibility in term s of dominance. The new 
unit has only access to th e  most recently added dcu an d  the dcus th a t dom inate 
it. Since an adjoined u n it is always to the  right of lower segments in a D PT , only 
the dcus of the rightmost nodes of the tree are accessible. The other nodes cannot 
be resum ed, i.e., their D 9s are not accessible. Furtherm ore, NPs th a t have been 
introduced in such closed-off dcus cannot be picked up  by pronouns in the new 
unit.
C( Jim , PAST, learn  cooking)
2 .1 .1 . A d ju n ctio n
This section aims at explaining a syntactic device th a t Polanyi (19SS) uses implic­
itly. At the  same time, it proposes a modification of thfc LDM in order to make it 
more transparent, theoretically  more appealing and easier to formalize.
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A djunction is a structure-preserving operation on graphs, which can be d i­
vided into two sub-operations: (i) The targeted node splits up in to  two segments 
(which are still one node), so th a t the upper segment is dom inated by the sam e 
nodes as the original node was, while the lower segment dom inates the  same nodes 
as the original node did. Furtherm ore, the upper segment im m ediately dom inates 
the lower one. (ii) A new node is added to this two-segment node, so th a t the 
upper segment im m ediately dom inates it.
I propose th a t every step th a t updates discourse s truc tu re  —  including b o th  
subordination  and co-ordination steps — take the form of adjunction  syntactically. 
Due to its structure-preserving character — and to the parallelism  between syntax 
and sem antics — , adjunction ensures m onotonicity in semantics.
A djunctions th a t yield subordinations are always proper adjunctions. The 
subordinating  dcu forms the lower segment of the adjunction, w hereas the u p ­
per segment is the subordination dcu itself. The two segments form  one node, 
especially as the  have the same c f :
(17) l ( x ) + 2 ( j , )  =>
As for adjunctions th a t result in co-ordination, Polanyi either adds a new branch 
to the co-ordination (this can only happen when the new dcu is adjoined to an 
already existing co-ordination, see (18) below), which is not an ad junction  a t all, 
or creates a new co-ordination node when so needed. This ad junction  is im proper, 
because the lower segment of the adjunction (the old dcu) and the upper segment 
(the co-ordination dcu) cannot have the same context frame (see (19) below).
(18) C (G \J(x,y))  + 3  (*)=> C (G U (.r,y))
l(x )  2(y) l (z )  2 (y) 3 (z)
(19) l(z )  +  2(y) => C (G U (x ,y)) 
l(x )  2 (y)
The type of operation in (18) can be transform ed into an im proper adjunction, 
so th a t the old co-ordination dcu becomes the lower segment, w hereas the upper 
segment is a  newly created co-ordination dcu with a new frame:
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(20) C{z) + l(x) =4>
2.2. L D M  and C C FC
We have seen that the relation th a t I dubbed SED plays a central role in the 
analysis of CCFC. As a consequence, a necessary condition of embedding CCFC 
into the LDM is to incorporate the SED relation into the theory. To do this, I 
propose to  collapse the SED relation with the IS-A relation. Given tha t both  
concepts are defined in a ra th e r vague way, there is no a priori reason why they 
could not be the same. To assess w hether this is feasible on empirical ground, I 
will briefly consider some facts about CCFC again.
Quiescent common bases and focussed clauses of CCFCs can be transformed 
into (audible) subordinations. For example, the CCFCs in (9-11) can be converted 
into ( 9 '- l l ')  below, where the  continuations in (-a) and (-b) are alternative sub­
ordinated dcus to the first sentence:
(9') The accommodaiion worked out well.
a. It is that Peter who slept on the floor.
b. It is that the host moved to a hotel.
(10') The cake is not here.
a. It is that Peter did not bring it.
b. It is that the confectioner has not prepared it yet.
(IT ) The light is not on.
a. It is that Peter turned it off.
b. It is that there is a power cut in the whole house.
As can be seen, each one of th e  pairs of contrastively co-ordinated clauses of (9— 
11) can act as clauses subordinated to a clause that expresses their common base. 
This justifies the identification of SED w ith IS-A.
It seems, then, tha t C C FC  can be embedded into the LDM, if we assume 
th a t every subordinated dcu contains the sub-formula tha t its proposition is IS-A- 
related to the proposition of the  subordinating dcu. Since every dcu is a possible 
subordinated dcu, the translation  of every dcu has to contain the sub-formula tha t 
there is a proposition that its D e is IS-A-related to. This sub-formula is identical 
with the sub-formula corresponding to the SED that I have added to the translation 
of clauses to account for propositional focus. In this sense, Polanyi’s LDM is an
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independent m otivation for doing so. This way of representing /^ - in h e r ita n c e  
challenges com positionality, since the D 9 of the subordinating  dcu m ust cross- 
sententially ‘b ind’ the  proposition tha t the D 9 of the subord inated  dcu is IS-A- 
related to. Com m on-base inheritance in CCFCs also challenges com positionality. 
A panacea for b o th  will be presented in section 3.
A direct em bedding of CCFC into Polanyi’s LDM, however, does no t seem 
viable. If one intends to IS-A-relate the proposition of the focussed clause to  the 
common base, one should create a  subordination where the quiescent com m on 
base is the  subordinating  dcu and the focussed clause is the subo rd ina ted  one. 
The assum ption of vacuous dcus is not appealing a t all. Furtherm ore: In case of 
contrastive co-ordinations, not only the common base should subord inate  th e  first 
clause, b u t one also has to assume the existence of ano ther subord ination  betw een 
this subordination  and  the second clause. The co-ordination would be transform ed  
into a  double subordination  (cf. (21) below). This is heavily counter-in tu itive.
(21) C S(  CB)
l( z )  2{y) S(CB> 2<y>
0(CB) Ux)
To sum  up, the fram e-inheritance mechanism of the LDM provides C C FC  w ith  
the desired cfs. Since the subordination dcu inherits its D 9 from the subord inating  
dcu, b o th  focussed propositions are IS-A-related to  the common base. On th e  o ther 
hand, the  s tru c tu ra l properties of CCFC cannot be accom m odated in the existing 
LDM machinery.
2.3 . IS -A  and  G U
Subordinability and co-ordinability are expressed in term s of IS-A and GU. If an 
IS-A relation holds between the D 6s of two dcus or the application of GU to  two 
dcus result in non-trivial context frames, then the two dcus can be subo rd ina ted  or 
co-ordinated, respectively. Due to the frame inheritance m echanism  of the LDM , 
the D 9s of a subordination dcu and th a t of its subordinated  dcu also s tan d  in  an 
IS-A relation. I will show th a t the D 9 of every co-ordinated dcu is also IS -A -related 
to th a t of its co-ordination dcu. F irst, I will show th a t the D 9 of each co-ordinated 
dcu (except for the ones w ith downward m onotone N Ps) is IS-A -related to the  D 9 
of the co-ordination dcu, even in the Hobbsian sense. In the second step , I will 
show th a t the IS-A relation of Polanyi holds even between the D 9s of co-ordinated 
dcus w ith downward monotone NPs and the D° of their co-ordination dcu.
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Polanyi considers Hobbs’ definition of IS-A as the core of the sem antic rela­
tio n  in subordination. So if two propositions stand  in a  H obbsian relation, then 
th e y  also stand  in  a Polanyi-type IS-A relation between them . The sum m ary of 
H o b b s’ definition is that (i) th e  propositions th a t are IS-A -related have a  com­
m o n  entailm ent; and (ii) an argum ent of the second proposition of IS-A is more 
specific than th e  corresponding argument in the  first. (In addition, (iii) the  above 
argum ent has a  counterpart in  the common entailm ent as well.)
F irst I will show that po in t (ii) holds between a co-ordination dcu and any 
of its  constituents. The GU computes ‘the m ost specific common denom inator’ 
for each slot of the  context fram es of the co-ordinated dcus. But even ‘the  most 
specific denom inator’ can a t m ost be as specific as the slot it has been generalized 
from . If every slot is a representation of a  type of argum ent, there m ust be at 
le as t one slot —  or a part of a  slot — that is more specific in the fram e of the 
co-ordinated dcu than in th a t  of the co-ordination itself. O therwise it is not a 
co-ordination. So I am left w ith  the first point.
In  order to  prove tha t co-ordinated dcus have non-trivial entailm ents, I first 
have  to make it  explicit how the  reconstruction of D 9s works in the case of co­
ordination. As for the slot for properties and relations, GU abstracts  over the  most 
specific common meaning postu la te  of the predicates in question (all the  b e tte r  if 
th ese  meaning postulates define the common predicate of the  co-ordinated clauses). 
As for the slot for individuals, I suppose th a t GU abstrac ts  over the m ost specific 
com m on properties of the individuals in question (all the b e tte r if these properties 
define an individual).6 Therefore it is not crucial th a t the  reconstruction should 
provide a D 9 w ith  the appropria te  type of quantifier. I  assume th a t Polanyi’s 
G U  works as follows: if all N Ps of the co-ordinated dcus were non-downward- 
m onotone, existential quantification would do in the D e of the co-ordination dcu 
(cf. (22) below ).7
(22) First co-ordinated clause:
Every lion runs.
Second co-ordinated clause:
Some zebras galop.
D e of their co-ordination dcu:
‘Some (savannah) anim als move fa s t’
It is conceivable tha t th e  existential quantifier does no t work in case of down-
6 The alternative of this k in d  of operation is not too appealing. If GU abstracted  
over the biggest set of common referents, much of the generalization would 
be lost.
7 I call an N P downward m onotone if if the tests for quantifiers th a t are down­
ward m onotone in their second argument justify it.
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ward m onotone NPs. Indeed, sometimes there is no quantifier th a t would do. 
Consider:
(23) First co-ordinated clause:
A t most five ladybirds creep.
Second co-ordinated clause:
No may-bug crawls.
D e o f their co-ordination dcu: ???
I do no t know how to solve this problem in term s of reconstruction. I know, 
however, how to solve it in term s of IS-A. F irst, I prove th a t the D 6s of dcus w ith 
non-downward-m onotone NPs are IS-A-related to the D 6 of the co-ordination dcu.
P (a ) |= 3x.P (x)
This is tru e  irrespective of the type of P , a and x. T he form ula rem ains tru e  even 
if P  in the  entailm ent is replaced w ith a superset of P .  T he relation betw een the 
D e of a  co-ordinated dcu and th a t of the co-ordination itself is ju s t an  instance 
of this. Since everything th a t follows from the logical consequence of a  form ula 
follows from  the  form ula itself, point (i) of the H obbsian definition is satisfied as 
long as we consider cases w ith non-downward-monotone N Ps.8
Step two: Polanyi’s IS-A relation accounts for cases w ith pure dow nw ard 
m onotone NPs. It is easy to find a subordinating clause for either one of the  co­
ordinated clauses in (23), cf. (24) below. Since the D e of the subord inated  dcu is 
IS-A -related to the D e of the subordinating dcu, th is m eans th a t Polanyi’s IS-A 
relation easily accounts for the D e of co-ordination c/cus like
(24) a. Insects hardly move these days.
b. At most five ladybirds creep.
c. No May-bug crawls.
Polanyi’s IS-A relation does not account for clauses w ith  N Ps of mixed m onotonic­
ity, a lthough it seems possible to co-ordinate them:
(25) a. A lion often has no difficulty catching its prey.
b. Every lion runs.
c. No zebra galops.
The co-ordinability of (25b) and (25c) can easily be explained in term s of IS-A. The 
D es of b o th  are IS-A-relatcd to the proposition ‘lions are much faster th an  zeb ras’,
One can m anage to  find analogous argum ents in the  common en tailm en t to 
satisfy point (iii) as well.
8
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which is a possible D e of the co-ordination itself. This in term ediate proposition 
is, of course, IS-A -related to (25a).
T h e  next task  is to  replace GU with IS-A bo th  as a condition on co-ordinability 
and  as an operation to  com pute cfs. The co-ordinability condition will sound as 
follows: an old dcu of the discourse and a new unit can be co-ordinated if the 
set of propositions th a t the D e of both  dcus is IS-A-related to has at least one 
non-triv ia l element. Let the m ost informative elmenet of this set be the D e of the 
new co-ordination dcu. This replaces the GU operation.
T h is move has the  following im portant consequences:
(A ) The GU operation  can be dispensed with.
(B ) CCFC can be represented as a co-ordination (cf. Figure 3). The m ost in­
formative proposition th a t the D e of either dcu is IS-A-related to is exactly 
the  common base. In th is sense, CCFC provides independent m otivation 
for replacing GU with IS-A.
T h a t is, the new definition accounts for co-ordinations th a t could not have been 
cap tu red  otherwise.
C (m ost inform ative 2 6 (IS-Aj, fl IS-Aj,)), alias (CB)
l(z )  2 (y)
Figure 3.
3. D y n a m ic  D isc o u r se  S em an tics
T he task  of th is section is to give a formal account of the non-com positional 
p roperties of b o th  CCFC and the LDM. I will present a dynam ic semantics for 
discourse s truc tu re  along the lines of Groenendijk and Stokhof’s (1990) Dynamic 
Predicate Logic (D PL ). This semantics does not account for all the  effects of the 
LD M , bu t the trea tm en t of CCFC will be preserved by the form alization.
In  section 3 .1  I will outline some properties of dynamic sem antics in general 
and  of DPL in particu lar. Section 3 .2 is about the central idea underlying the 
dynam ization of the  LDM, which I will form ulate in a dynamic discourse semantics 
in section 3.3.
3 .1 . D y n a m ic  L ogics an d  D P L
T he definitive p roperty  of dynam ic semantics is th a t it conceives of the meaning 
of a  sentence no t as its tru th  conditions, bu t as the way in which it changes
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the inform ation s ta te  of the hearer. T hat is, the m eaning of a sentence is a  
function m apping inform ation states before its u tterance  to  inform ation s ta tes  
after u tte rin g  it. The various types of dynamic sem antics differ in the way they 
represent inform ation states. Some semantic systems characterize such states by 
the  functions th a t assign values to free variables (or ‘discourse referents’). D PL 
and H eim ’s (1982) ‘File Change Sem antics’ belong to this type. O ther theories 
represent inform ation states by pairs of in terpreta tion  functions and assignm ent 
functions (such as Beaver’s (1992) KPL). These functions m ay be fully specified 
functions com patible w ith an inform ation sta te  (as in D PL), or may be partia l 
functions specified only for a subset of ‘salient’ expressions (such as the  discourse 
referents in H eim ’s theory).
D ynam ic Pred icate  Logic accounts for certain phenom ena related  to  anaphoric 
relations, such as cross-sentential anaphoric binding and donkey anaphora, b u t it 
can only deal w ith  extensional, first-order formulae. T he language into which 
natural-language sentences are translated  is th a t of first-order predicate logic. O n 
the  o ther hand , conjunction is not in terpreted in a com m utative m anner, and the  
translations m ay contain free variables tha t are in terpreted  as if they were bound  
by quantifiers in formulae to  the ir left.
T he in te rp re ta tion  of a  D PL formula is a  relation betw een assignm ent func­
tions. In each pair th a t belongs to  such a relation, the first m em ber is a possible 
input inform ation state, whereas the second m em ber represents the corresponding 
o u tp u t sta te . For some expressions the input and the o u tp u t states are identical. 
These can only im pose conditions on the input inform ation states. They are said 
externally sta tic , and they are called tests (e.g., conditionals are of this type). 
In the in te rp re ta tio n  of o ther expressions, the input and ouput assignm ents can 
be different. These expressions can change states of inform ation, and are called 
externally dynamic (in particu lar an existentially quantified form ula is externally  
dynam ic, because it introduces a new variable binding). There are also several 
ways of conjoining two expressions: in some cases, the second sub-form ula is in ­
te rp re ted  w ith  respect to the ou tp u t state  created by the first. In this case, the  
resulting expression is internally dynamic (dynam ic conjunction belongs here). 
O therwise, it is said internally static  (as, e.g., disjunctions).
3 .2 . T h e  C en tra l Id ea
Polanyi (1988) form ulates a well-formedness condition in term s of D PT s, namely, 
on the accessibility of old dcus to new ones. According to Polanyi’s condition, the  
accessible dcus are the m ost recently adjoined dcu and the  dcus th a t dom inate 
it. This affects bo th  possible ways of continuing discourse them es and anaphora  
resolution. T he continuability of a discourse them e m eans th a t it can reappear 
in — or affect the com putation of — a newly added constituent. So, clearly, 
the possibility of adjunction and continuability are connected w ith each other.
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This is n o t the case w ith  anaphora resolution. The LDM does not explain how 
possible adjunction and anaphora resolution are connected. As a  m a tte r of fact, 
the LDM  has nothing to  say about the  distribution of pronouns. On the o ther 
hand, anaphora  resolution is the central concern of DPL which, however, cannot 
deal w ith  th e  book-keeping of discourse themes. B ut these two phenom ena seem 
interconnected, as shown by (26) below.9
(26) 1 Mr. Morrisi has three daughters.
I 2 Mary2 is the eldest.
3 She2 admires her2 father\,
4 but she2 would find it childish to display it.
I 5 A fter all, she2 is a real woman.
I 6 She2 already has a boyfriend3.
I 7 Sue4 is the middle one.
I 8 Sue4 loves h im \/*h im 2, too.
I 9 ffM ary2 may even stay out all night.
Subordination enables pronom inals in their subordinated dcu to be p re fe r ­
ential w ith  NPs in the subordinating  dcu even from a considerable linear distance. 
However, no resolution is possible between an NP in a  subordinated dcu and a 
pronoun outside the subordination, even if they are quite close to each other (cf. 
boyfriend^ and him3 in 6, and him3 in 8). The same is true  for discourse themes. 
A discourse theme is easy to continue via subordination, b u t no continuation is 
possible if the subordination has already term inated, as 9 shows.
T h e  above generalizations can be captured in a  dynam ic spirit as follows: 
subord ination  is internally dynamic and  externally semi-static regarding bo th  an­
aphora resolution and discourse them e continuability. (By ‘sem i-static’ I m ean 
th a t only one of the sub-form ulae is dynamic, the o ther one is static.) Given this 
form ulation, DPL can be extended to  account for the continuability of discourse 
them es a n d  anaphora resolution simultaneously.
3.3 . E x ten d in g  D P L : D P L D M
The a im  of this section is to develop a  system of dynam ic discourse semantics. 
The system  will be called DPLDM, since it is a contam ination of DPL and the 
LDM.
3 .3 .1 . T h e  M ach in ery
S tarting  from  the DPL side, the trea tm ent of discourse themes makes it possible
9 T h is  example is analogous to one of Grosz (1988), a  technical description of 
th e  dismantlem ent of a w ater pum p.
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to modify the concept of inform ation states. In DPLDM , they will be sim ilar to 
w hat Polanyi (1988) calles context frames. T h a t is, the inform ation content of 
an entire context will be represented as one cf, as if all contextual inform ation 
originated from a single dcu. For the sake of simplicity, however, I will om it the 
‘tim e’ slot from cfs. So a cf representing an inform ation s ta te  will be characterized 
by an (individual) assignm ent function (for the participants) and  a propositional 
variable (for D e). As in DPL, the meaning of an expression is a relation over pairs 
of inform ation sta tes , i.e., of cfs of this sort. The first m em ber of each pair is the 
cf th rough  which the  expression can be incorporated to earlier discourse (inpu t 
state), whereas the  second m ember is the cf th rough which subsequent expressions 
can be a ttached  to it (ou tpu t state).
As a  m a tte r  of course, only those expressions will denote relations over infor­
m ation sta tes which correspond to dcus in the LDM (we will call these discourse 
formulae or DFs in the following) or operators on such formulae. These together 
form the  vocabulary of DPLDM . O ther expressions will be in terp re ted  as in DPL. 
The distinction  between DPL expressions and D Fs, we will use a  special operation 
th a t creates discourse formulae from formulae of ordinary predicate logic. We will 
call this operation  discoursivization, and indicate it by boxing the form ula in
question. In addition, we will introduce the operators ‘s ’ and ‘c ’ for subordination  
and co-ordination, respectively:
(27) Discourse Formulae
T he set of discourse formulae (D Fs) is the smallest set such tha t:
(i) If 9? is a  form ula th a t corresponds to  a dcu in LDM and  none of its 
subform ulae does, then  [9?] is a DF;
(ii) If $  and  T are DFs, then so is $  S 'L;
(iii) If $  and T are DFs, then so is <3? C T.
It follows from  the above definition th a t DPLDM is built ‘on top o f’ DPL. DPLDM  
does not in te rp re t atom ic formulae, it is parasitic on DPL in th a t respect.
An expression is in terpreted  w ith respect to a model M. — (D ,W ,F ), where 
D  is a non-em pty set of individuals, W  a set of possible worlds, and  F  the in­
te rp re ta tion  function. We will distinguish W KCt as the set of propositions true  in 
the actual world, and  ISA x as the set of propositions th a t are IS-A -related to the 
proposition X .  An assignment function g assigns an individual to each variable 
(it is a to ta l function). G is the set of all assignm ent functions, and T is the set of 
all propositions.
The sem antic-value function [-]M will assign values to bo th  D PL formulae 
and DFs. In the case of a  DPL formula, it yields a subset of G 2, whereas for DFs 
it yields subsets of G x T x G x T. If 97 is a DPL formula, then
[ m \ M =def { (g , G, h , H) : ( g , h)  € [g>}M L H  = H e  ISAG},
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where | • is the classical (static) first-order semantic-value function. I will leave 
out the  index M for sim plicity’s sake. The assignments g and h are inherited from 
the  D PL formula, while G and H  are propositions, namely, the input and output 
D 9s, respectively. H  is $ ’s own discousre theme, whereas H  serves as an input 
D 9 for subsequent expressions. The expression H  £ ISA ^ functions as h[x]g does 
in D PL. It determines to  w hat extent the input and the  ou tpu t states can /m ust 
differ from  each other.
Subordination is a  type of dynam ic conjunction. As I said earlier, it is in ter­
nally dynam ic and externally sem i-static. If $  is a D F, then
[* S T] =def {(<7, G, h, H ): (g, G, h , H) £ [$] & 3k3K .(h , H, k, K ) £ ['!']}.
If two ‘atom ic’ DFs are in subordination, the IS-A relation between their D 9s is 
ensured by the transfer of the second D 9 of the first to the  first D 9 of the second. 
This corresponds to the in ternal dynam ism  of D 9s in subordination. The internal 
dynam ism  also applies to  variables, since the assignment h is also transm itted  
from  $  to  T. External sem i-staticity is alse ensured: The ordered quadruple 
of the  subordination as a whole is identical to th a t of the  subordinating DF, so 
neither the D 9 nor the new variables of the subordinated DF are accessible from 
the  outside. Both the D 9 and the variables introduced by the subordinated dcu 
are accessible by a D F X  th a t is, say, subordinated to T , bu t then the structure 
of the resulting formula m ust be S (T  S A ).
Co-ordination is also a type of dynamic conjunction. It is both externally 
and internally dynamic. The complexities it involves stem  from the fact th a t we 
replace the LDM’s n-ary  w ith a  binary operation (cf. section 2.3). In Polanyi’s 
LDM, n dcus create one new dcu w ith a new cf in an n-ary co-ordination. If 
we split such co-ordinations up into binary co-ordinations, we face the following 
dilemma: Either every b inary  co-ordination forms a new dcu with a new D 9 or none 
of the co-ordinations form new D 9s. The former solution consider co-ordination 
externally  dynamic, at least from the discourse theoretic point of view, whereas 
the  la tte r  views it as externally static. I will show th a t the former option fits the 
facts be tter.
Polanyi assumes an in term ediate D 6 in a ‘topic chain’ such as (15) which is 
indispensable (in (15), it is ‘Peter learned cooking for a  long tim e’). It is IS-A- 
re lated  to the D e of the head of the chain, and every co-ordinated dcu is IS-A- 
re la ted  to it. It cannot be dispensed w ith because the D 9s of the co-ordinated 
dcus are not really IS-A-related to the  D 9 of the head. The following example is 
not a  felicitous subordination:
(28) 1 Jim is a great cook.
I t^ 2 He took all the home ec. courses in the high school.
To account for the in term ediate D 9s, propositional variables have to behave 
in a dynam ic way externally:
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[$ C ] =def {{g, G , h , H ) : H  G ISAG &
k  3k, K .(g , FT, Jb, A') e [$] & 3L.(k,  H,  h, L) e [*]}.
The stipu la tion  th a t f i  6 ISAG makes it possible for the co-ordination dcu to  have 
a  D 9 on its own, i.e., an interm ediate D 9. (If we were to consider co-ordination 
static, H  =  G would s tan d  here.)
From the point of view of internal dynam ism , individual variables an d  D 9s 
behave differently from  each other. Individual variables behave in a dynam ic 
way internally, ju s t like in DPL, whereas D 9s do not. The D 9s of co-ordinated 
DFs are still connected to each other: they m ust be IS-A -related to one and  the 
sam e D 9, th a t of the co-ordination. This is certainly true when the co-ordinated 
DFs are ‘a tom ic’: The D 9 of the co-ordination itself (i.e., H  above) reappears 
as the inpu t D 9 of the  co-ordinated DFs, and there is an explicit sub-form ula in 
discoursivization, which guarantees th a t they should be IS-A -related. T he  case 
when the  co-ordinated D F is a co-ordination itself is analogous, i.e., H  is IS­
A -related to  G. If the  co-ordinated constituent is a subordination , it is always 
the subordinating  constituent th a t m atters: w hatever it is, it can be recursively 
recuded to one of the above cases.
I will show how DPLDM  works on the following example of a ‘topic chain ’:
(29) 1 An ex-schoolmate of mine is a great cook.
2 He worked as a cook in the army.
3 He took the Cordon Bleu Course in France last year.
[ G 3 s ( | c  [3])] =
=  {(gt G , h , H ) G [mi:3k , K . ( h , H , k , K )  e  [\2\ c  0]]}  =
=  {(9, G, h, H): (g , h) G [1] k  H  = | l | f  k  H  e  ISAG k  
3k ,K .K  G ISA// k  3m, M .(h, K , m ,  M)  £ [CD] k  
3L . ( m , K , k , L )  G [El]} =
=  { ( g , G, h , H) : ( g , h )  G [1 } k H  = | l | f  k  H  £ ISAG k
3 k , K . K  g ISA h k  3 m ,M .{h ,m )  G [2 \ k M  = \2\™ k M  € ISA a- k  
3L. (m, k)  € [3] k  L — | 3 | f  k  L G ISA//}.
Any fu rth er elaboration of this would require the sem antic m achinery of the  LDM 
as well as the in ternal logical structu re  of the clauses. I stop here because w hat 
we have so far is sufficient to show how dynam ism  works in the  above exam ple, 
although a  deeper analysis would be desirable.
As for the dynam ism  of individual variables, (29) is in ternally  dynam ic for 
each conjunct. The o u tp u t assignment of the first form ula (i.e., h) is the  input 
assignm ent of the second, and the ou tpu t assignm ent of the second (i.e., m ) is 
the inpu t assignm ent of the third. The entire formula, however, is sem i-static. 
Only the o u tp u t assignm ent of the ‘subordinating form ula’ is accessible from  the
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outside. As far as the D 9s are  concerned, the  IS-A relations between the  D 9s of 
th e  clauses in (29) can be represented as follows (the no ta tion  G <—  H  stands for
‘H  e ISAg ’):
T here  is an interm ediate D 9, namely, 7\, to which the D 9s of the co-ordinated 
clauses are IS-A-related, and which is IS-A-related to the  D 9 of the subordinated 
clause. K  can be paraphrased as ‘He learned cooking in several places’, and it 
cannot be om itted. Neither (29 /2 ) nor (29/3) are elaborations of (29/1). Accord­
ingly, neither the D 9 called M  nor the D 9 called L are IS-A-related to H . G is 
th e  discourse them e through which the discourse fragm ent in (29) can be a ttached  
to  larger pieces of discourse.
3 .3 .2 . D P L D M  and C C F C
We can account for CCFC in DPLDM  by in troducing a new operator, th a t of 
propositional focus or FOC. Rem aining agnostic about the  representation of pre­
suppositions, I introduce a separate  operator th a t includes negation and proposi­
tional focus, called NEG-FOC.
C ertain restrictions on H ungarian are w orth taking into account. Neither 
propositional focus nor its negation can be iterated . Co-ordinations and  subor­
dinations cannot be focussed. So the new definition of Discourse Formulae is 
ex tended by the  following clauses:
(iv) If $  is a DF, then F O C ($ ) is also a DF;
(v) If $  is a  DF, then so is N EG -FO C ($).
The propositional focus opera to r does not affect the dynamism of the DF in 
its  scope; it merely enriches its D 9:
[FOC($)] =M { (g ,G,h ,H )G [*]:£■ = /\(IV ,ct nISAG)}.
T h e  constraint lH  =  A(W act O ISA g )’ should be fam iliar from section 1 .3 .2 . It 
m eans th a t H  is the infimum of the set of propositions th a t are both  true  in the 
actual world and are IS-A-related to G. The above form ula does not capture much 
of the generic m eaning of focus, and it is ra th e r stipulative. Its only m erit is th a t 
it shows th a t a semantic system  created for the trea tm ent of discourse structure  
yields the presence of G, or ‘the  common base’ for free. In this sense, DPLDM  
provides independent m otivation for propositional focus.
On the o ther hand, the negative propositional focus operator does affect the 
dynam ism  of the DF in its scope. The operator blocks the dynamism of individual
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variables in troduced  in its scope, bu t it does not affect the dynam ism  of D 9s. 
Negative focus asserts th a t the D 9 of the DF in its scope has a  deepest tru e  
explanation, and it m erely denies th a t this deepest explanation is the proposition  
th a t the D F in its scope expresses:
[N EG -FO C($)] =cef {(<7, G, h , H) : h  = g k
3k,  K. (g,  G, k, H)  € [$] k l <  = A (W act D ISA C) k  K  £  H) .
To illustra te  how these operators work, consider the following example:
(30) Nem [egy Fiúi köhög az utcán]F, 
not a  boy caughs the  s treet-on
hanem [a KUTYÁJA ugat nekÍ2 \F. 
b u t  th e  dog-POSSD barks he-DAT
‘It is not th a t a  boyi is caughing on the street, b u t th a t his2 dog is b a rk in g ’ 
[NEG-FO C([T |) c  FO C(|2])] =
=  { ( g , G , h , H ) : H  e l S A G k 3 k , K . ( g , H , k , K )  G [NEG-FOC( CD)] k  
3L . ( k , H , h , L )  e  [FOC([2])]} =
=  {(<7, G, h, H): H  € ISAg k  3k, K. k  =  g k  3m,  M. ( g , H,  m,  K )  g [ÍT1] k  
M  =  A(kFact n  ISA H) k M ^ K k  '
3L.(k,  H,  h, L) e  [[2]] k  L = A(W"act n  ISA //)} =
=  {(*7) G, h, H ): H  € ISAg k  BA:, K,  m,  M.(g,  m)  G [1] k  K  =  |1 |^  k  
K  G ISA// k  M  — A(Wact n  ISA//) k M ^ K k
3L.(g, h ) e [ 2 \ k L  = |2 |^  H g ISA// k  L  =  A (^ a c t D ISA //)} .
As for individual variables, the co-ordination in (30) should behave as b o th  ex­
ternally  and internally  dynamic. The operator N EG -FO C, however, blocks its 
in ternal dynam ism . So the ou tpu t assignment of the first sub-form ula (i.e., m ) is 
not the  input of the second. But the output assignm ent of the entire form ula (i.e., 
h ) is the o u tpu t of the last sub-formula. This explains why ‘a boy’ and  ‘his’ canno t 
be «/referential in (30). As for the D 9s, their IS-A s truc tu re  can be represented 
as follows:
H  is the in term ediate  D 9, which can be paraphrased  as ‘Some sharp , g u ttu ra l 
noises can be heard  from the outside’. It cannot be om itted: it is the com m on 
base of (30/1) and (30/2), i.e., the proposition th a t the CCFC in (30) presupposes. 
As before, G functions as the D e through which the entire CCFC can be a ttach ed  
to a larger piece of discourse.
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